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I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Stephen Schulhofer, leading scholar of rape law, reporter for the 
Model Penal Code (MPC) Sexual Assault Project, and founding father of the yes-
means-yes effort,1 argues that it is high time, indeed “past time,” for U.S. 
criminal law to require “affirmative consent” to sex.2 I have been asked to 
counter this assertion and make the case that sex without affirmative consent 
should not be an activity regulated by the government through criminal 
punishment. It is reasonable to understand the affirmative consent standard to 
mean: (1) sex must proceed in an artificial, overly cautious manner, involving a 
specific consent script, for example, asking for and receiving a “yes,” and (2) if 
 
∗  Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. I express special gratitude to Stephen 
Schulhofer for being an advocate of fairness and reason in the criminal code, a tireless law reformer, and an 
ethical and formidable debate opponent. Thanks also to Mike Vitiello and The University of Pacific Law 
Review for arranging this timely conversation. 
1.  Schulhofer does not, himself, endorse “only yes means yes,” but his writings on affirmative consent 
certainly helped pave the way for that movement. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, UNWANTED SEX: THE 
CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998) [hereinafter UNWANTED SEX]; Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151 (1995) [hereinafter The 
Feminist Challenge]. 
2.  See Stephen Schulhofer, Consent: What It Means and Why It’s Time to Require It, 47 THE U. OF 
PAC. L. REV. 665 (2016) [hereinafter Affirmative Consent].  Professor Schulhofer’s position has been evolving 
during the drafting and editing process of this Essay.  Thus, this Essay responds to the November 2015 draft of 
his symposium essay, which is on file with the law review and author, and the pages referred to herein 
correspond to that draft. 
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sex does not proceed in such a manner, one or both parties risk incarceration with 
inmates who might care little about consent, affirmative or not.3 There are many 
compelling critiques of this type of broad sex regulation, but I need not articulate 
them here.4 Professor Schulhofer’s proposal for this symposium and the related 
revisions to the MPC’s sexual assault provisions (hereinafter “MPC Draft 5”),5 
which I refer to interchangeably as the “expressive consent” proposal, do not in 
fact endorse this narrow vision of affirmative consent. Instead, they do something 
else altogether―something that is not extremely radical, does not upend sexual 
communication norms, and is not the embodiment of feminists’ radical views of 
sex. 
Schulhofer’s affirmative consent formulation is quite modest and unlikely to 
seize headlines: sex must occur with consent, which the defendant may determine 
from the all the circumstances, including words, conduct, and overall context.6 
Specifically, Schulhofer’s expressive consent proposal criminalizes sexual 
penetration without “consent,” defined as “a person’s freely given agreement to 
engage in a specific act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, communicated by 
conduct, words, or both.”7 Importantly, the provision clarifies that “consent may 
be explicit or it may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.”8 Thus, in 
order to find guilt, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that, given the 
entire picture of the situation, the defendant believed the sex was not consensual. 
It might make for a more interesting read were I to level charges of 
prudishness against Professor Schulhofer and call him the sex police who is 
going to stamp out exciting ambiguity and make sex boring and vanilla, but I 
cannot do so. The expressive consent proposal is light years away from schemes 
involving sex contracts, a verbal “yes,” or even “clear” consent. It ultimately 
allows for ambiguous communication and even the much-maligned traditional 
sex script,9 so long as, in the end, the jury finds that the defendant honestly and 
non-recklessly believed the complainant agreed to sex. 
 
3.  See infra notes 36–46 and accompanying text (discussing common interpretations of affirmative 
consent). 
4.  See infra notes 47–59 and accompanying text (briefly explaining debate over affirmative consent). 
5.  See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES (Preliminary Draft No. 5, 
October, 2015) [hereinafter MPC Draft 5] (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review).  The MPC 
sexual assault project is ongoing, and there have been many different drafts with changing concepts of consent 
since the writing of this Essay. 
6.   See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5. 
7.  Id. at 4; see also MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 32 (providing that “[c]onsent means a person’s 
positive, freely given agreement to engage in a specific act of sexual penetration” which must be 
“communicated by conduct words, or both”). 
 8.  MPC Draft 5 treats sex without consent as a misdemeanor and sex in the face of an “expressed . . . 
refusal to consent” as a felony.  Id. at 52.  It is not entirely clear that Schulhofer’s essay differentiates between 
sex without consent and sex in the face of refusal. See generally Affirmative Consent, supra note 2. 
Consequently, I leave discussion of that disparity for another day. 
 9.  See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 7 (critiquing gendered sexual interaction); cf. Annika M. 
Johnson & Stephanie M. Hoover, The Potential of Sexual Consent Interventions on College Campuses: A 
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This Essay argues that, while Schulhofer’s formulation avoids the popular 
critiques―or more accurately ridicule―of strict affirmative consent standards, 
the proposal is problematic in other ways. The formulation is abstruse, perhaps 
cleverly duplicitous, and it unnecessarily complicates the legal inquiry over 
consent. First, by using the term “affirmative consent” and making arguments 
about unambiguous green lights,10 stopping and clarifying,11 and moving social 
norms,12 Professor Schulhofer tacitly endorses, but does not ultimately have to 
defend, the more radical and regulatory formulations of affirmative consent. 
Second, the content of the formulation, perhaps because it seeks to straddle the 
line between ordinary consent and yes means yes, is confusing and its manner of 
application is not entirely clear. 
The Essay proceeds in three parts. First, it will demonstrate that Schulhofer’s 
proposal is, in fact, not affirmative consent, as the term is popularly understood.13 
Second, it will argue that Schulhofer’s expressive consent proposal does not 
necessarily fill the legal gaps he hopes it will, if indeed such gaps exist.14 Third, 
it will critique the project, both in terms of its choice of labels and its internally 
mystifying nature.15 In the end, the Essay asserts that the expressive consent 
revision is not an improvement on, and in fact may be less desirable than, more 
straightforward articulations of consent in rape law.16 
II. NOT AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT 
In order to establish that Professor Schulhofer’s proposal is not affirmative 
consent, some mapping is necessary. Accordingly, this Section provides a 
working understanding of various meanings of “consent” and “affirmative 
consent” to sex. It bears noting that this entire discussion sets aside the issue of 
whether the criminal law should define acceptable and unacceptable sex in terms 
of the complainant’s state of mind rather than in terms of the coercive means by 
which the defendant procures sex. Schulhofer’s starting point is that the criminal 
law has an interest whenever sex is unconsensual, regardless of why it is 
 
Literature Review on the Barriers to Establishing Affirmative Sexual Consent, 4 PURE INSIGHTS 2–3 (2015), 
available at http://digitalcommons.wou.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1050&context=pure (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting extensive findings that young people continue to regard men as 
sexual proponents and women as sexual gatekeepers and citing studies). 
10.  See MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 65 (asserting that silence should not be equated with a green light 
to engage in penetration). 
11.  See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 12 (stating that sex proponents have a “burden of inquiry” 
as to sexual consent but indicating that the burden can be satisfied through “ascertain[ing] whether the other 
party is willing”); see also infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (discussing the expressive consent 
standard’s connection to stop and ask). 
12.  See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 14; see also infra notes 140–42 and accompanying text. 
13.   Infra Part II. 
14.   Infra Part III. 
15.   Infra Part IV. 
16.   Infra Part V. 
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unconsensual.17 In fact, he regards the requirement of force as so passé and 
archaic as to barely merit mention.18 
The force-versus-consent debate is important, and something I take up 
elsewhere.19 For now, however, I will assume the liberal position that choice is 
the dividing line between acceptable and criminal sex.20 Of course, the 
philosopher in me queries, “Do we truly have free will?” And, the critical theorist 
in me is sympathetic to the view that structural inequality renders choice as an 
illusion and tool that preserves hierarchy. Indeed, radical feminists like Catharine 
MacKinnon argue that given oppressive patriarchy, women rarely have sex 
freely.21 However, this Essay puts aside critiques of liberalism and the larger 
debate of how sex fits into a feminist vision of state and society. Most proponents 
of affirmative consent, Professor Schulhofer included, do not indulge the belief 
that women’s consent to sex is always illusory.22 Instead, they adhere to the 
liberal notion that women authentically choose things, including sex, but debate 
over how to ensure that sex is in fact consensual.23 
A. Consent 
So what does it mean to say that sex must be “consensual?” Lawyers, 
philosophers, and social scientists are in fair agreement that there are different 
but related ways to look at consent.24 Consent can either be an internal mental 
state of agreeing or being willing to do something, an external act of expressing 
agreement to something regardless of internal feelings, or both internal 
agreement and external communication.25 For many, the lynchpin of consent is 
an internal decision, and they balk at the notion that sex might be called 
 
17.  Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
18.  See id. at 1 (putting aside the force issue because the “unmistakable trend” toward consent). 
19.   See Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion. __ CARDOZO L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter 
Gruber, Consent Confusion]. 
20.  See Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal Scholarship on Rape: A Maturing Look at One Form of 
Violence Against Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35, 38 (1995) (observing that “liberal feminism” 
shaped rape reform in the “classic liberal ideology of privacy, autonomy, and individual choice”); See generally 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 L. & PHIL. 35 (1992). 
21.  See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 647 (1983) [hereinafter Toward Feminist Jurisprudence] (stating “the conditions 
of male dominance” in both rape and “consensual” intercourse make distinguishing the acts difficult; thus, “free 
consent” to sex is rare for women); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO STATE L.J. 1081, 1088 (2004) (remarking more recently that “unequal sex can 
flourish and masquerade as equal sex, as sex as such, with the result that sex that is forced, coerced, and 
pervasively unequal can be construed as consensual, wanted, and free”). 
22.  See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 2. 
23.  See infra note 33 (asserting that the consent debate cannot avoid the issue of constraints on free 
choice). 
24.   See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 3–5. 
25.   Id at 5.  For a more extensive discussion of consent and affirmative consent, see Gruber, Consent 
Confusion, supra note 19. 
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“unconsensual” when both parties, in fact, mutually desired it.26 Others feel that 
asking a jury to divine the intent of a rape complainant sets up a difficult task that 
jurors will fulfill simply by applying stereotypes or unreflectively embracing the 
defendant’s version of events.27 Thus, the jury should be directed to look at what 
the complainant and defendant did, and not what the complainant thought. 
Schulhofer’s proposal is a purported advance from the ordinary internal 
consent inquiry in the sense that it explicitly embraces external consent and 
specifies that “communication” of agreement is a necessary ingredient of lawful 
sex.28 The proposal makes it a crime to knowingly or recklessly engage in sexual 
intercourse without “consent,” which “means a person’s freely given agreement 
to engage in a specific act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, communicated 
by conduct, words, or both.”29 Although the meaning of this language is not 
entirely self-evident, I think it is fair to interpret Schulhofer’s consent as having 
two necessary components: (1) an uncoerced internal agreement/willingness to 
engage in the relevant sex act, and (2) words, actions, or both that communicate 
this agreement.30 
Rape reformers embrace expressive consent requirements believing such 
requirements foreclose the distasteful argument, “she really wanted it despite 
what she said.”31 Critics reject expressive constructions because they criminalize 
wanted sex in the absence of specific communication.32 However, a careful 
examination of the dynamics of consent as they play out in rape trials reveals this 
debate may be much ado about nothing. Upon close analysis, it is clear that there 
is little difference between applying internal and expressive consent. The real 
debate lies in whether and how to limit what counts as evidence of internal or 
external consent. Merely specifying that internal agreement also be 
communicated, standing alone, does not greatly alter the rape consent inquiry. 
In a rape trial with an internal consent standard, jurors will come to a 
conclusion, not by speculating about the complainant’s internal state in the 
abstract, but by considering the entire “consent transaction” between the 
defendant and complainant. Let us take a very straight-forward internal consent 
sexual assault provision: “It is a crime to knowingly or recklessly have sex 
without consent.” How will the jury decide whether sex between two people, A 
 
26.  See, e.g., Kim Ferzan, Consent and Culpability, __ OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. __ (forthcoming 2016) 
(draft on file with author). 
27.  See generally MPC Draft 5, supra note 5. 
28.   See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5 (“‘Consent’ means a person’s freely given agreement to 
engage in a specific act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, communicated by conduct, words, or both.”). 
29.  Id.  
30.   See Susan E. Hickman & Charlene L. Muehlenhard, By the Semi-Mystical Appearance of a Condom: 
How Young Women and Men Communicate Sexual Consent in Heterosexual Situations, 36 J. SEX RES. 258, 259 
(1999) (defining “consent” as “the freely given verbal or nonverbal communication of a feeling of willingness). 
Schulhofer’s definition appears nearly identical to this definition. 
31.  See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 4 (expressing this concern). 
32.  See id. at 5 (discussing artificiality argument); see also infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
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& B, was consensual? I assert that the common view of a sexual consent 
transaction involves the following three steps: (1) A internally decides to have 
sex with B; (2) A displays external manifestations of that agreement; and (3) 
from these external manifestations and the context, B concludes that A has 
internally agreed to sex, and vice versa.33 Thus, in a case where internal consent 
is disputed, the prosecution will assert that A did not internally agree to sex; the 
defense will respond that A did internally agree or B (reasonably) believed A 
did;34 and the jury, not being mind-readers, will resolve the issue by looking at 
A’s external manifestations in context.35 
Thus, in a purely internal consent inquiry, the jury will ultimately look at A’s 
and B’s external behaviors in context to determine their respective intents 
regarding the sex. One might wonder, then, whether requiring consent to be 
communicated changes anything. If any type of external manifestation combined 
with any type of context evidence can count as communication, the answer is, 
“no.” In other words, the world of evidence that the jury can consider in 
determining internal agreement is co-extensive with the world of evidence that 
the jury can consider in determining expressive consent. Thus, expressive 
consent simply collapses into the indications of consent the jury would look at to 
determine A’s mental state. However, not all expressive consent proposals allow 
all external manifestations and all context evidence to count toward consent. 
B. Affirmative Consent 
Affirmative consent standards generally seek to limit both the world of 
external manifestations that express consent and the ways in which those external 
manifestations can be contextualized. The Venn diagrams on the following page 
provide a sense of the difference between saying that “A must express internal 
consent” and “A must give affirmative consent.”  
The Affirmative Consent circle can be larger or smaller depending on the 
strictness of the affirmative consent rule. The narrowest construction of 
affirmative consent discussed―and frequently scorned―by the public is the 
signed, notarized contract. Only a miniscule subset of sexual communication, if 
any at all, involves this particular external manifestation. However, as Professor 
Schulhofer points out, the contract version of affirmative consent is largely a 
 
33.  In this symposium, Schulhofer does not really take up the issue of what “free” agreement means, so 
although it is a hotly debated issue within the American Law Institute (ALI), I leave that debate for another day.  
For a deeper inquiry into consent and a diagram of the “consent transaction,” see Gruber, Consent Confusion, 
supra note 19. 
34.  See MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 52 (specifying a mens rea of knowledge or subjective recklessness 
for sexual assault, in contrast to the many jurisdictions that adopt a negligence). 
35.  A and B will likely diverge in their accounts of the external manifestations and the context, in which 
case the jury will consider evidence corroborating or undermining the parties’ factual claims and other indicia 
of credibility, as in any other type of trial. 
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product of the derisive discourse of reform opponents who seek to make a 
mockery of the standard.36 
 
      1. Broad Expressive Consent   2. Narrow Affirmative Consent 
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Indicating Internal Consent                                 Indicating Internal Consent 
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More realistically, affirmative consent can be understood as requiring A, the 
sex acceptor, to utter the word “yes.”37 This definition is reflected in the common 
sentiment, expressed in the blogosphere, on college campuses, and by some legal 
reformers, that “only yes means yes.”38 Despite the “yes” requirement’s benefit 
of administrability, many acknowledge that insisting on a specific word to 
legitimize sex is artificial and unrealistic, given the heterodoxy of intimate 
signaling.39 Consequently, common forms of affirmative consent allow for some 
interpretive license in determining what amounts to a “yes.” 
From my perusal of the web, college regulations, and affirmative consent 
statutes, it seems that there is a burgeoning consensus on what affirmative 
consent requires: a person seeking intercourse must stop, explicitly seek 
 
 36.  See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 3 (chiding the “popular media” for describing affirmative 
consent in “preposterous” terms of written contract); see also Callie Beusman, ‘Yes Means Yes’ Laws will Not 
Ruin Sex Forever despite Idiotic Fears, JEZEBEL (Sept. 8, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://jezebel.com/yes-means-yes-
laws-will-not-ruin-sex-forever-despite-i-1630704944 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
37.  See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 2 (noting this argument). 
38.  See, e.g., Student Rights and Policies, Appendix B: College Sexual Misconduct Policy, AMHERST 
COLL., available at https://www.amherst.edu/mm/77199 (last visited Apr. 17, 2016) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Relying on non-verbal communication can lead to 
misunderstanding…in the absence of an outward demonstration, consent does not exist.”); cf. Tovia Smith, 
Campuses Consider Following New York’s Lead On ‘Yes Means Yes’ Policy, NPR (July 8, 2015, 6:34 PM) 
http://www.npr.org/2015/07/08/421225048/ campuses-consider-following-new-yorks-lead-on-yes-means-yes-
policy (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting the governor as characterizing NY’s 
affirmative consent bill as requiring “[t]he other person…to say yes.  It’s yes on both sides.”). 
39.  See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 10 (calling it “absurd” to “insist[] that nothing except the 
word ‘yes’ can establish consent”). 
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permission, and obtain permission in some “clear” form.40 This stop-and-ask 
approach puts a legally enforceable obligation on the sex proponent (often 
imagined as male) to seek and obtain a “yes”―or perhaps its functional 
equivalent―from the sex acceptor (imagined as female).41 Many affirmative 
consent formulations also specify that affirmative consent be ongoing.42 Taken 
literally, this might require the sex acceptor to utter an extended “yyyeeeesssss” 
throughout a make-out session and sexual intercourse. However, the 
“continuous” and “ongoing” language likely means that the stop-and-ask 
performance must be repeated at certain critical times throughout a sexual 
encounter, whatever those may be.43 
Consequently, a common understanding of what affirmative consent requires 
is something like this: (1) A and B are kissing or making-out; (2) B stops and 
forthrightly asks for permission to have intercourse (“Do you want to do it,” 
“Let’s have sex,” etc.); and (3) A clearly responds in the affirmative (“I want to 
have sex,” “Let’s get it on,” etc.). There is no question that partners sometimes 
communicate sexual consent using such a script. However, the existing social 
science tells using this type of a script is more exception than rule.44 Thus, even 
the less rigid forms of affirmative consent make up a small subset of the universe 
of ways in which consent is currently communicated.45 Consent to sex is often 
expressed through a fluid series of actions. Mutually agreeable sex often involves 
no direct questioning. Consent is often understood through ambiguous statements 
and context. Professor Schulhofer acknowledges as much, stating that 
“increasingly intimate foreplay” can sufficiently signal agreement.46 
 
40.  See, e.g., WESLEYAN UNIV., 2015–2016 UNIVERSITY STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS 23 (2015), 
available at http://www.wesleyan.edu/studentaffairs/studenthandbook/20152016studenthandbook.pdf (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Consent must be freely and affirmatively communicated 
between all individuals in order to participate in sexual activity or behavior. It can be expressed either by words 
or clear, unambiguous actions. It is the responsibility of the person who wants to engage in sexual activity to 
insure consent of their partner(s)”). 
41.  See S.B. 967, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (enacted by Ch. 748) (requiring the sex 
proponent to “ensure” that there is affirmative consent). 
42.  See Yale Sexual Misconduct Policies and Related Definitions, YALE UNIV., http://smr.yale.edu/ 
sexual-misconduct-policies-and-definitions (last visited Aug. 1, 2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) [hereinafter “Yale Sexual Misconduct Policies”] (“Consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual 
encounter.”). 
43.  Cf. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 4 (requiring consent to a “specific act”); MPC Draft 5, 
supra note 5, at 32 (requiring consent for “each act”).  For a more in depth discussion of specific affirmative 
consent rules and the arguments for and against them, see Gruber, Consent Confusion, supra note 19. 
44.  See Johnson & Hoover, supra note 9, at 2–3 (noting extensive findings that young people continue to 
regard men as sexual proponents and women as sexual gatekeepers and citing studies). 
45.  Cf. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 3 (acknowledging that the “absence of any sign of 
unwillingness is a common way to communicate receptivity”).  
46.  Id. 
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Affirmative consent proponents seek to limit the world of consent indicators 
for a variety of reasons.47 Proponents characterize reform as necessary to counter 
state actors’ and jurors’ mistaken, or worse sexist, beliefs that anything and 
everything counts as consent.48 Moreover, when the law allows ambiguous 
behavior to be explained by context, it invites the jury to look at prejudicial 
things like “promiscuity,” manner of dress, and past sexual behavior.49 The 
corresponding contention is that affirmative consent rules make factual 
determinations of actual agreement more accurate.50 Critics respond that juries 
are not necessarily retrogressive and may actually be accurate,51 given that sexual 
consent is often nonverbal, ambiguous, and signaled through passive 
engagement.52 Further, evidentiary rules, including specialized ones, already 
exist to control prejudicial context evidence.53 In any case, highly sexist state 
actors and jurors prone to nullification can disregard an affirmative consent law 
just as easily as they can ordinary consent laws.54 
Affirmative consent reformers rejoin that even if people do not currently 
perform consent affirmatively, they should.55 The criminal law, they argue, 
expresses a behavioral norm that people must conform to, even if common 
practice is to do otherwise. So long as individuals have notice of the proscription, 
 
47.  Since Schulhofer does not in fact endorse a narrow affirmative consent requirement, these reasons 
do not really apply to his proposal. See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.  Thus, my discussion of 
arguments in favor of affirmative consent here is brief.  For a fuller catalogue of the pro and con arguments in 
the affirmative consent debate. See Gruber, Consent Confusion, supra note 19. 
48.  See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 6 (characterizing open communication as normal); Beatrice 
Diehl, Affirmative Consent in Sexual Assault: Prosecutors’ Duty, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 508 (2015) 
(stating that an affirmative consent standard will combat jurors’ adherence to “rape myths” about how women 
communicate about sex and clarify the “confusion” by establishing that only yes means yes); cf. Toward 
Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 20, at 652–54 (opining that reasonable consent will reflect a male-oriented 
point of view). 
49.  Cf. Yale Sexual Misconduct Policies, supra note 42 (creating an affirmative consent standard to 
discourage “[p]resumptions based upon contextual factors (such as clothing, alcohol consumption, or 
dancing)”). 
50.  See generally Affirmative Consent, supra note 2. 
51.  See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 11 (noting this argument). 
52.  See Terry P. Humphreys & Mélanie M. Brousseau, The Sexual Consent Scale–Revised: 
Development, Reliability, and Preliminary Validity, 47 J. OF SEX RES. 420, 421 (2010), and studies cited 
therein. 
53.  See FED. R. OF EVID. 412; see generally Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to 
Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (2002) (discussing 
rape shield laws). 
54.  This is actually an empirical question of whether there is a subset of sexist decision makers who 
would acquit under a regular consent standard but convict under an affirmative consent standard. It is difficult 
to imagine that this group is very big. More likely, the overtly sexist juror is a lost cause and the people affected 
by the change will be nonsexist jurors, who examine the evidence fairly in determining consent or lack thereof.  
Affirmative consent laws might make these jurors feel obligated to convict because there was no specific stop-
and-ask performance, even when they conclude the complainant consented and communicated that consent. 
55.  See, e.g., Nicholas J. Little, Note, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results 
of an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321, 1356 (2005) (analogizing affirmative 
consent to civil rights laws that “led popular culture”). 
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it is fair to enforce the new norm through authoritarian means.56 This is the most 
contested aspect of affirmative consent reform. Critics forcefully argue that it is 
wrong to impose radically reformist norms of sexual behavior by incarcerating 
those who merely engage in ordinary practices.57 This makes too much typical 
behavior criminal and vests the government with too much prosecutorial 
discretion—discretion it may apply in a discriminatory manner.58 Some also 
instinctively blanch at this vision of a sex regulatory state that mandates 
dispassionate negotiation over passionate desire.59 
In sum, the touted benefits of affirmative consent include controlling sexist 
juries, reducing prejudicial and traumatizing contextual evidence, and 
establishing a liberatory and clear norm of sexual communication.60 The 
purported drawbacks include punishing people who reasonably discern consent, 
granting too much discretionary authority to police and prosecutors, and creating 
a sex regulatory state.61 The narrower the definition of affirmative consent, the 
greater the benefits and drawbacks. I believe that the critics have the better of the 
arguments, for reasons I explain in more detail elsewhere.62 Those with a healthy 
skepticism of carceral authority should be very circumspect about forcing 
compliance with emerging sexual norms through criminal punishment. 
Moreover, it is fair to worry that the new-found punitive authority to prohibit a 
substantial amount of currently lawful sex will presage unanticipated and 
random, if not racialized and harmful, distributional effects.63 Finally, one with 
feminist sensibilities can certainly question whether the stop-and-ask norm is 
merely a more administrable, sanitized, and legalistic form of the “traditional” 
sex script in which men are sexual proponents and women are gatekeepers. 
However, I need not belabor those arguments here, as Schulhofer’s expressive 
consent formulation, for the most part, creates neither the benefits nor the 
problems of affirmative consent. 
 
56.  See infra notes 136–42 and accompanying text for discussion of this contention. 
57.  See, e.g., Cathy Young, Campus Rape: The Problem with ‘Yes Means Yes’, TIME (Aug. 29, 2014), 
http://time.com/3222176/campus-rape-the-problem-with-yes-means-yes/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (lauding the goals of affirmative consent, but stating that “having the government dictate 
how people should behave in sexual encounters is hardly the way to go about it”). 
58.  See U.S. DEP’T OF J., UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012 OVERVIEW, at 
Table 43, available at https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/ 
tables/43tabledatadecoverviewpdf. (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (demonstrating that, 
as with all violent crimes, the proportion of blacks arrested for sexual offenses far exceeds the proportion of 
black in society). 
59.  In turn, some affirmative consent proponents have turned to cringe-worthy public relations 
campaigns to establish that “affirmative consent” is sexy. 
60.   See generally Affirmative Consent, supra note 2. 
61.   Id. at 13. 
62.  See Gruber, Consent Confusion, supra note 19; Aya Gruber, Rape Revisited, __ OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
__ (forthcoming 2016). 
63.  See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 15–16. 
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C. Expressive Consent 
Recall that Schulhofer’s expressive consent standard requires A to 
“communicate[] [agreement] by conduct, words, or both.”64 In turn, B must “look 
for” such “affirmative indications of willingness.”65 Does this require B to stop, 
deliberately solicit, and receive clear permission? It appears not, given that B 
must merely “look for” signals of agreement and not actively pursue them.66 The 
issue, then, is whether Schulhofer means to differentiate “affirmative indications 
of willingness” from all possible external manifestations of internal agreement. 
Although the use of the word “affirmative” indicates that this may be the case, 
Schulhofer elsewhere makes clear that he does not seek to limit what counts as a 
communication of willingness.67 His definition specifically provides that consent 
“may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.”68 Those circumstances 
include things like increasingly intimate foreplay, ambiguous statements 
rendered meaningful in context, and anything else a person with “common sense” 
would think communicates agreement.69 Another thing that can in certain 
circumstances count as consent is silence.70 Schulhofer explains: 
[A] contextually sensitive standard of consent-by-conduct should leave 
room for considering silence and passivity, together with all other 
circumstances, in assessing whether a person’s conduct communicates 
positive agreement. The point to stress is that while silence and passivity 
cannot by themselves be treated as consent, they are forms of conduct, 
and all of a person’s conduct should be taken into account. This approach 
avoids the artificiality of positing that silent acquiescence can never 
constitute consent.71 
Schulhofer’s standard, like the internal consent inquiry, counsels decision-makers 
to look at all of A’s external manifestations within the particular context of the 
case to determine whether A’s state of mind was one of willingness (or B 
believed it was).72 The standard seeks to avoid “artificiality,” which is to say that 
it rejects an aspirational norm that strays too far from actual sexual 
communicative practices.73 In this sense, the expressive consent standard is more 
properly characterized as norm-reflecting rather than norm-changing. 
 
64.  Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5. 
65.  Id. at 4. 
66.   See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 4. 
67.   See The Feminist Challenge, supra note 1, at 2181. 
68. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5. 
69.  Id. at 4–5. 
70.   See id. at 4. 
71.   Id. at 4.  
72.   See id. (advocating looking at the totality of a person’s behavior to determine willingness).  
73.  Id. at 5. 
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Nevertheless, Schulhofer’s resistance to artificiality has its limits. He gives 
the jury free reign to interpret the external manifestations in context and 
determine internal agreement, with one notable exception: the jury may not infer 
that A internally agreed if A’s external manifestations include a no (a “verbal 
expression of unwillingness”), unless A engaged in “subsequent words or actions 
indicating consent.”74 While this formula recalls a no-means-no standard, it is 
actually more like “no means no unless it means yes.” Any subsequent—though 
curiously not preceding or simultaneous—words or actions indicating consent 
can counter the “no.” These post-“no” words or actions do not have to be of a 
special quality. Thus, if a jury is assessing a package of communication that 
happens to include a “no,” its analysis remains unchanged, so long as the 
complainant did something after the no.  
In any case, even with the modified no-means-no provision, the expressive 
consent formulation is far from yes means yes. It might be up for debate whether 
even this qualified no-means-no standard is too artificial and arbitrarily excludes 
reasonable consent scenarios,75 or whether its costs are outweighed by the need 
to check society’s tendency to think that no means yes more often than it actually 
does.76 However, I will put the no-means-no issue aside for now. The point is 
that Schulhofer’s version of affirmative consent bears little resemblance to sexual 
assault laws and policies that mandate contracts, yeses, or Q&As.77 
Under his standard, people do not have to materially shift their views about 
manifestations that indicate agreement. The jury retains wide discretion to decide 
whether the external manifestations, in context, indicate internal agreement.78 It 
remains free to look at any relevant admissible circumstance to contextualize the 
external manifestations.79 Verdicts can reflect a range of views regarding proper 
sexual communication, and, indeed, such views may diverge sharply from the 
enlightened sex script.80 Accordingly, Schulhofer’s standard, properly 
understood, will not appeal to those who tout affirmative consent for its ability to 
strictly confine juror discretion, eliminate “bad” or ordeal-inducing context 
evidence, and establish norms of clear sexual communication. 
 
74.  Id. at 5. 
75.  For example, A says no laughingly while directing B’s intimate parts towards his or hers. 
76.  For example, creating a social norm that no must always mean no. 
77.  Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5. 
78.  Compare id. at 4–5 (“a contextually sensitive standard of consent-by-conduct should leave room for 
considering silence and passivity, together with all other circumstances, in assessing whether a person’s conduct 
communicates positive agreement”) with Yale Sexual Misconduct Policies, supra note 42 (requiring “direct 
communication” and disallowing “[p]resumptions based on contextual factors”). 
79.  Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 10 (explaining that the finder of fact is free to look at the 
surrounding circumstances). 
80.  That is, unless Schulhofer here uses the word “affirmative” to mean that the indications of consent 
must be of a certain character (like verbal or unambiguous). However, I do not think the word is meant to 
manage the external manifestation analysis in this manner. Rather, I think Schulhofer is directing sex-
proponents to search the liaison record for indications of consent as opposed to not caring or, worse, proceeding 
in the face of indications of nonconsent. Again, the word “affirmative” here is unnecessarily confounding. 
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At the same time, the formula avoids many of the common critiques directed 
at affirmative consent. The standard is not very sex regulatory. It does not require 
magic words, or any words, and all contextualizing evidence is fair game.81 So 
long as there are common-sense signs of agreement, sex is beyond the purview of 
the criminal law.82 Sex proponents may thus proceed on equivocal signals that, 
under the specific circumstances, indicate agreement.83 Given that the proposal is 
virtually indistinguishable from the ordinary consent inquiry, one might be 
wondering whether there is a critique here. There is. Part III will discuss the costs 
associated with both the framing and substance of the project.84 Professor 
Schulhofer believes his reframing of consent is a subtle but crucial reform that 
covers gaps created by ordinary consent laws.85 However, the proposal is 
mystifying—an imperfect compromise.  Adding unnecessary complexity to an 
area that demands clarity does not well serve the Model Penal Code and 
American Law Institute (ALI) membership.  
III. MIND THE GAPS 
The expressive consent formulation purports to address a “large class of 
cases [that] fall[] into a grey area where a person’s willingness to accept sexual 
intimacy is unclear, but his or her ability to protest is also unclear”―cases 
including “surprise, tonic immobility, and heavy drinking.”86 Apparently, the 
idea is that there are many situations where a victim does not protest because of a 
lack of sufficient time, fright (unrelated to direct coercion), and debilitating 
drunkenness and, in such situations, a jury applying an ordinary consent standard 
would reason that such passivity constitutes consent.87 Schulhofer, for example, 
makes much of the possibility of injustice in cases involving precipitous 
penetration.88 Although his symposium essay does not provide concrete 
examples, the MPC draft discusses at length a 1994 California case, People v. 
Iniguez.89 In that case, the victim stayed overnight at her friend’s house and was 
raped by Iniguez, her friend’s fiancé, whom the victim had met that night.90 The 
victim was asleep face down in the living room when around one or two a.m., a 
naked Iniguez approached her from behind, pulled down her pants, penetrated 
 
81.   See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5. 
82.   See id. at 10–11. 
83.   See id. at 4 (recognizing that consent is often communicated equivocally). 
84.   See infra Part III. 
85.   See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2. 
86.  Id. at 11.  
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. at 10-11. 
89.  See People v. Iniguez, 872 P. 2d 1183 (Cal. 1994); see also MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 61. 
90.   Iniguez, 872 P. 2d at 1184. 
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her, ejaculated, and left.91 Because of the rapidity of Iniguez’s actions and the 
frightening circumstances, the victim was unable to actively protest.92 
Why is this a highlighted example of the need for affirmative, or at least 
expressive, consent? Did a jury find that the victim consented because she failed 
to say no? Was a judge persuaded that the defendant believed there was consent 
because the victim did not resist or refuse? No. In fact, Iniguez’s case for consent 
was so deficient that he conceded, on the stand no less, the victim had not 
consented.93 Instead, Iniguez’s attorney attempted to undermine the law’s 
force/fear requirement by arguing that, in his drunken state, the defendant did not 
realize he had placed the victim fear.94 The jury rejected this argument and 
convicted Iniguez of rape.95 And although a court of appeals reversed for lack of 
sufficient evidence that Iniguez used specific means to induce fear,96 the 
Supreme Court of California reinstated the conviction on the ground that the 
distinctive coercive circumstances could lead the jury to reasonably conclude that 
Iniguez placed the victim in fear.97 
The court of appeals’ decision might counsel in favor of some clarity on what 
counts as “means of fear,” when such is statutorily required, but it is difficult to 
see how Iniguez is even relevant to a debate over affirmative consent.98 The jury 
did not find that the victim’s silence and acquiescence constituted consent, and 
they would not likely have done so in the absence of the defendant’s admission.99 
Instead, the jury seemed perfectly capable of looking at the situation, including 
the defendant’s and victim’s behavior in context, and finding that the victim did 
not agree to sex.100 Now, there may be statutes that premise rape on a clear 
expression of nonconsent, and under such statutes, silence would not fulfill the 
actus reus. Schulhofer, for example, cites to a provision under New York law 
clarifying that a felony third-degree rape conviction requires that “the victim 
 
91.  Id. at 1185. 
92.   Id. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. at 1185–86 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 2015)). 
95.  Id. at 1186. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. at 1190 (“The jury could reasonably have concluded that under the totality of the circumstances, 
this scenario, instigated and choreographed by defendant, created a situation in which Mercy genuinely and 
reasonably responded with fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury, and that such fear allowed him to 
accomplish sexual intercourse with Mercy against her will.”). 
98.  The California Supreme Court favored a definition of force that included precipitous sex. See id. at 
1189 (“Sudden, unconsented-to groping, disrobing, and ensuing sexual intercourse while one appears to lie 
sleeping is an appalling and intolerable invasion of one’s personal autonomy that, in and of itself, would 
reasonably cause one to react with fear.”). 
99.   Id. 
100. Perhaps one could argue that this was just a good jury, and there are juries out there bent on 
acquitting in an Iniguez situation. However, an expressive consent rule would hardly move such a sexist jury.  
That jury would simply conclude that some movement or utterance by the victim expressed consent or find 
consent through her passivity in context. 
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clearly expressed that he or she did not consent.”101 However, New York law 
elsewhere fills that gap with a provision making it a crime to “engage[] in sexual 
intercourse with another person without such person’s consent.”102 
Schulhofer and MPC Draft 5 also adopt the view that there is some 
widespread phenomenon of women freezing in fright during intimate encounters, 
going lifeless during sex, and being unable to seek justice under ordinary consent 
standards.103 Few would dispute that women who are suddenly viciously attacked 
or face threatening, coercive circumstances (as in Iniguez) might instinctively 
freeze or consciously decide that acquiescence is the safest route.104 But, it is also 
fair to say that such immobilization is highly unlikely in ordinary intimate 
encounters.105 Moreover, assume there was an unusual case where a couple were 
willingly kissing and the complainant suddenly became overwhelmingly 
frightened—say, because of past, undisclosed trauma—and thereafter acquiesced, 
or even feigned willingness, out of fear. One might rightly wonder whether 
criminally punishing the defendant is appropriate in such a case. Nevertheless, 
this is all somewhat beside the issue, which is whether the ordinary consent 
standard equips juries to determine whether a placidly acquiescent party facing 
an environmentally coercive situation has consented.106 Simply, there is no 
reason to believe that juries are unable to determine when a passive person, in the 
given context, has agreed to sex. 
The second gap that the expressive consent formula purports to fill is the 
space between incapacitated sex, which is criminal, and highly intoxicated sex, 
which may be highly disturbing, but is not illegal.107 As Professor Schulhofer 
notes, many rape codes severely penalize defendants for having sex with 
incapacitated―basically unconscious―persons.108 A subset of jurisdictions 
criminalize sex with a person who is not blackout incapacitated but meets a 
certain threshold of choice-defeating intoxication.109 The MPC currently 
 
101. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney 2013). 
102. Id. § 130.20. 
103. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 11; MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 62 (calling “frozen 
fright” a frequently recurring problem[]”). 
104. The studies on freezing cited by the MPC Draft all discuss “paralysis,” “infantilism,” and “tonic 
immobility” as responses to an extreme fear situation.  See MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 62. 
105. Cf. Brian P. Marx et al., Tonic Immobility as an Evolved Predator Defense: Implications for Sexual 
Assault Survivors, 15 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI. & PRAC. 74, 79 (2008) (theorizing that sexual assault may 
produce an involuntary passive response like those seen in animals facing extreme conditions, but postulating 
that “[tonic immobility] ought to be more likely only after several behavioral strategies (i.e., escape, screaming, 
and fighting back) have failed and general feelings of fear have escalated into extreme fear or panic”). 
106. The case highlighted by MPC Draft 5 to illustrate this point, People v. Warren, 446 N. E. 2d 591, 
593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983), is inapposite. In that case, a stranger quickly carried the victim to the bushes, undressed 
her, and had sex with her. The jury convicted, but the court of appeals reversed based on the antiquated 
requirement of resistance, not because of its reading of consent. See MPC Draft, supra note 5, at 61. 
107.  Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 6.  
108. See MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 81 & nn. 220–21 (citing cases). 
109. See id. at 81–82 (discussing the different approaches and their complexities). 
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prohibits sex with an intoxicated, but not unconscious, person only when the 
defendant surreptitiously drugged the victim for the purpose of imposing sex.110 
MPC Draft 5 significantly expands the intoxication provision and prohibits 
intoxicated sex whenever the victim is in a state of “torpor,” that is, “laps[ing] in 
and out of consciousness.”111 The draft thus covers both intoxicated passed-out 
victims and nearly passed-out victims, but Schulhofer worries that even the 
broadened draft provision is under inclusive.112 He envisions situations where the 
complainant is conscious and not in a state of torpor, but is nonetheless 
intoxicated enough that s/he does not or cannot meaningfully agree to sex, for 
example, when the complainant is vomiting, moaning, and curling into a ball, but 
not passing out.113 
In an ordinary consent inquiry, the jury will look at the totality of the 
circumstances, including vomiting, moaning, and curling into a ball, etc., to 
determine the complainant’s internal agreement or lack thereof. Depending on 
what else is going on, a jury might find consent despite the complainant’s 
significant intoxication, or nonconsent despite the complainant’s relative 
sobriety.114 Frankly, it is difficult to understand how an expressive consent 
formula, or even a yes-means-yes standard, would helpfully intervene in the 
drunkenness inquiry. Drunk complainants will likely exhibit a range of behavior 
from “no” to “yes, yes, yes.” Whether “yes” is uttered says nothing about the 
capacity of the utterer/non-utterer. There is no particular reason to believe that in 
the universe of drunken sex, the cases involving a lack of affirmative expression 
meaningfully overlap with the cases involving severe, consent-defeating, but not 
unconscious or semiconscious, intoxication. Thus, affirmative consent only fills 
the intoxication gap by perhaps putting more defendants in jail―some of whom 
had sex with those who were too drunk to meaningfully consent and some of 
whom did not.115 
Expressive consent will fare even worse at managing drunkenness cases than 
stronger affirmative consent formulations. Instructing the jury to look for 
expressions of consent will not do much to increase the conviction rate of those 
who have sex with intoxicated individuals, given that in the vast majority of 
 
110. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1. 
111. MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 85. 
112.  Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 6. 
113. See id. (intending the expressive consent rule to address intoxication cases not covered by 
incapacity, or even “torpor” rules). 
114. Some universities policies indicate that in cases of mutual intoxication, even the more passive party 
would is liable―a suggestion that should give all of us pause. See, e.g., COLUMBIA UNIV., GENDER-BASED 
MISCONDUCT POLICY FOR STUDENTS (POLICY) 20–21 (revised Aug. 1, 2014) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
115. See supra notes 108–14, and accompanying text (explaining it does not necessarily make the 
drunkenness inquiry more accurate). 
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cases there will be something that counts as expression.116 In fact, an explicit 
directive to look at expressions could have the effect of leading the jury to focus 
on the fact of communication rather than the intoxicated origin of it. 
In the end, the gap-filling arguments demonstrate Schulhofer’s skepticism of 
people’s ability to divine the true meaning of silence and passivity. The 
requirement of communicative consent is meant to push back against the 
assumption that consent to sex is perpetually present until an unequivocal 
refusal.117 We would not assume that the person sitting next to us in a conference 
room consents to sex with us just because s/he hasn’t expressed a lack of desire, 
he explains, so we should not assume that complainants consent to defendants 
just because they do not protest.118 But, this argument collapses two very distinct 
scenarios. Of course, most ordinary citizens would say it is outrageous for 
individuals to presume that anyone and everyone in proximity wants to have sex 
them. And a person who acted on such a presumption by, for instance, following 
another from the conference room to the bathroom and precipitously penetrating 
them, would almost certainly be convicted under any consent standard. 
However, disputed consent cases present a different scenario altogether: 
Defendants assume consent, not because of the complainant’s bare existence, but 
because of specific interactions on the relevant occasion. The thorny issue is the 
intricacy of sexual interaction―the many interpretable things that happen 
between sitting in a conference room and lying naked on a hotel bed.119 We do 
not have to worry about the Iniguez’s, the crawl-through-the-window surprise 
attackers, or the bathroom stalkers being exonerated. They will be convicted 
under ordinary consent laws. Today’s controversies involve deciding exactly 
when a person is permitted to conclude that consent exists based on pre-sex 
intimate interactions―what occurs in between the boardroom and the 
bedroom.120 
The expressive consent proposal largely does not weigh in on how to 
interpret various external manifestations.121 Indeed, it is difficult to envision how 
the proposal will fill a passivity-silence gap when it allows omissions, in context, 
to count as consent. Ultimately, the law directs the jury to look at both parties’ 
 
116. MPC Draft 5 cites the infamous St. John’s rape case as a situation in which the expressive consent 
formula might helpfully intervene. MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 62.  In that case, the victim was extremely 
intoxicated when several men performed sex acts on her.  The men argued that she actively consented to the 
incident and lied about it later to protect her reputation.  The jury ultimately sided with the defense due to 
“inconsistencies” in the prosecution’s case. See E.R. Shipp, Sex Assault Cases: St. John’s Verdict Touches Off 
Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 1991), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/25/nyregion/sex-assault-
cases-st-john-s-verdict-touches-off-debate.html?pagewanted=all (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review).  How would the requirement that the complainant express consent have changed the outcome? 
117. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 4 (critiquing the presumption that silence equals consent). 
118. Conversation with Schulhofer at MPC Sexual Assault Project Advisers’ meeting (Oct. 2015). 
119. See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text (discussing context). 
120. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra notes 115–19 and accompanying text. 
2016 / Not Affirmative Consent 
700 
actions and inactions before intimate contact, during foreplay, and after 
intercourse to determine whether there was consent.122 The fact that the 
expressive consent standard does not resolve difficulties in interpreting passivity 
and silence is evidenced elsewhere in Schulhofer’s proposal.123 To check juries’ 
tendency to think failure to protest always equates with consent, Schulhofer adds 
this specific provision: “Lack of physical or verbal resistance does not by itself 
constitute consent.”124 
Consequently, the expressive consent formulation has a solution-in-search-
of-a-problem quality: It seeks to fill nonexistent gaps, and those that cannot be 
filled merely by requiring communicative consent. This, combined with the 
observation in Part I that Schulhofer’s formula is not a radical departure from 
ordinary internal consent standards, appears to render the formula 
neutral―neither a radically progressive reform, nor a disastrous mistake. 
However, the fact that the expressive consent proposal avoids some popular 
critiques of affirmative consent does not mean it is beyond reproach. The next 
Section discusses the problems with both the framing and the substance of the 
proposal. 
IV. WHAT’S IN A NAME? 
In his essay, and in MPC Draft 5, Schulhofer discusses and dismisses many 
of the common criticisms of affirmative consent—criticisms that affirmative 
consent is artificial, regulatory, punitive, and potentially discriminatory.125 He 
argues that his formulation of affirmative consent is not artificial, carceral, etc.126  
However, this argument is not a defense of affirmative consent so much as 
confirmation that Schulhofer’s formula is not affirmative consent. It is because 
expressive consent is virtually indistinguishable from ordinary consent, that it is 
not prone to the artificiality critique.127 It is because expressive consent is far 
broader than affirmative consent that it does not amplify the regulatory authority 
of the state or grant greater discretion to police and prosecutors.128 As a result, 
one cannot accuse Professor Schulhofer of setting up a radical carceral standard 
that greatly diverges from ordinary cultural practices. My critique of his modest 
proposal is, therefore, modest. 
Simply put, Schulhofer’s expressive consent standard is unduly confusing 
and not an improvement on straightforward sexual assault laws that prohibit sex 
 
122. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 4. 
123. Id. at 4–5. 
124. Id. 
125. See id. at 15; supra notes 55–65 and accompanying text. 
126. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5. 
127. Save, perhaps, for the no-means-no provision. See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text. 
128. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 11–13. 
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“against the will” or “without consent” in the ordinary meaning of those terms.129 
The problems with Schulhofer’s standard are both external―a matter of 
labeling—and internal—a matter of the actual operation of the standard. 
Externally, the term “affirmative consent” may confuse people about the nature 
of the expressive consent proposal and lead them to believe that the MPC is 
adopting some form of a yes-means-yes or stop-and-ask standard. Internally, it 
will be practically difficult for jurors and jurists to apply a consent standard 
unmoored from complainants’ intent and tethered to an undefined 
communicative threshold. 
Turning to the external issues, Schulhofer and MPC Draft 5 refer to 
expressive consent as “affirmative consent,” with all that implies, rather than 
“consent” or even “expressive consent.”130 When those versed in sexual assault 
issues confront the term “affirmative consent,” they get an idea of what the law 
involves. Some will think contract or verbal yes.131 Many will think the standard 
entails something slightly less onerous. Again, I believe the burgeoning 
consensus is that affirmative consent requires something like stopping and 
asking.132 In any case, I would venture that the vast majority of knowledgeable 
commentators understand affirmative consent to, at some level, regulate the type 
of communication that counts as consent. 
Calling the proposal “affirmative consent” may have been a strategic attempt 
both to gain support from affirmative consent-loving prosecutors and feminist 
activists and to satisfy more skeptical defense attorneys and libertarians with the 
actual substance of the provision. One should not, however, achieve by artifice 
that which he cannot through political consensus. In any case, the taxonomical 
move has resulted in considerable confusion. As it stands, American Law 
Institute members on both sides of the debate have different notions of what the 
MPC Draft 5 provision entails, and many appear under the mistaken impression 
that the provision limits, in some fashion, the external manifestations that count 
as communicative consent.133 Anti-rape activists who laud the draft for including 
“affirmative consent” understand it to preclude defendants from arguing that 
kissing or even making-out, without more direct communication, counts as 
consent.134 Civil libertarians who critique the draft fear that it requires a contract, 
a verbal “yes,” or at least stopping and asking.135 
 
129. See MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 58–60, and n. 150 (listing jurisdictions that adopt a definition of 
sexual assault as sex without consent, including those that, as opposed to specifying that there must be verbal 
agreement, allow the jury to determine consent in its “ordinary usage”).   
130. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 3–5. 
131. See supra notes 107–13 and accompanying text. 
132. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
133. See infra text accompanying notes 134–35. 
134. Conversation with former prosecutors at MPC Sexual Assault Project Advisers’ Meeting (Oct. 
2015). 
135. See Janet Halley, The Move to Affirmative Consent, SIGNS (Nov. 10, 2015), http://signsjournal.org/ 
currents-affirmative-consent/halley/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Judith Shulevitz, 
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Furthermore, Schulhofer’s substantive comments and the MPC Draft 5 
commentaries appear to defend more robust versions of affirmative consent.136 
Schulhofer is sometimes careful to distance his proposal from narrow affirmative 
consent programs in order to demonstrate that a given critique is inapposite.137 
His response to the artificiality concern, for instance, distinguishes broad 
expressive consent from “written contracts, artificial verbal formulas or any other 
unrealistic behavioral ritual.”138 Other times, Schulhofer makes arguments that 
defend the narrowest and most contrived versions of affirmative consent, like the 
contract.139 Consider his argument on social norms: “Using criminal law to 
discredit widespread but harmful social norms can be fair and effective.”140 This 
argument could apply with equal force to a “nudge” and a “shove” that diverges 
greatly from existing practice.141 In fact, MPC Draft 5 forcefully argues that 
criminal law’s punitive nature makes it a particularly appropriate tool of radical 
social change: 
Because criminal law is the site of the most afflictive sanctions that 
public authority can bring to bear on individuals . . . it must often be 
called upon to help shape [social] norms by communicating effectively 
the conditions under which commonplace or seemingly innocuous 
behavior can be unacceptably abusive or dangerous.142 
Those who consider sex-without-a-yes a dangerous, though commonplace, social 
practice can easily invoke Schulhofer’s argument that the criminal law should be 
used to “discredit” it. 
Perhaps more troubling is Schulhofer’s treatment of the incarceration and 
discretion arguments. In response to the contention that his proposal can 
exacerbate the problems of severe criminal punishment and mass incarceration, 
the Professor asserts that concerns over harsh sentencing “should not drive . . . 
substantive offense definitions,”143 and that “sexual offense policy is [not] a 
cause” of mass incarceration.144 The disaggregating of sexual assault liability 
from high sentences and the human rights nightmare that is mass incarceration—
 
Regulating Sex, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/opinion/sunday/judith-
shulevitz-regulating-sex.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
136. See, e.g., Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 10-11 (requiring more than passive silence for 
consent). 
137.  See id. at 3 (calling the contract version of affirmative consent “preposterous”). 
138. Id. at 16. 
139. See infra text accompanying note 142. 
140. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 14. 
141. See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 607, 619 (2000). 
142. MPC Draft 5, supra note 5, at 15. 
143. Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 15. 
144. Id. at 13. 
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a questionable tactic in and of itself—immunizes any sex regulation from 
structural and consequentialist critique. One could, for example, defend 
outlawing sex without a contract or even prohibiting sex during college by 
postulating that such laws could carry modest sentences and speculating that they 
would not significantly increase the incarcerated population.  
Similarly, Schulhofer writes off worries over prosecutors using broad 
affirmative consent laws to coerce pleas in cases of weak evidence because, 
given numerous existing “fallback” charges, such a “troublesome dynamic” will 
inevitably persist.145 These arguments about norm-shaping, the liability-
punishment divide, and prosecutorial discretion rationalize, or minimize the costs 
of, expanding criminal liability in general. They are not tailored justifications of 
the more modest expressive consent proposal. Accordingly, such contentions 
typically presage radical punitive reform and often appear in the debate over 
norm-changing affirmative consent provisions, like yes means yes. 
To be sure, Schulhofer’s use of the “affirmative consent” label may simply 
reflect some Machiavellian genius in crafting a law that at first glance appears to, 
but does not actually, impose a yes-means-yes requirement, in order to further its 
adoption as a social norm without the cost of incarcerating reasonable actors. But 
this is a dangerous tactic. Jurisdictions may adopt, and prosecutors, police, and 
jurors may apply the MPC provisions in their apparent form―requiring an 
unequivocal, if not verbal, communication of agreement.146 Moreover, those with 
more regulatory notions of affirmative consent will draw on the many pro-reform 
arguments in Schulhofer’s essay and MPC Draft 5’s commentary, like the 
argument that norm shifting is worth carceral costs, to support more radical and 
punitive reform.147 
The problems are not resolved merely by renaming the proposal “consent” 
rather than the more freighted “affirmative consent.” There are complexity issues 
created by unmooring the consent inquiry from the complainant’s mental state 
and mandating a communication threshold without specifying what it is. To 
begin, let us look at an internal consent standard and Schulhofer’s expressive- 
consent formulation side by side, highlighting the differences: 
Penetration without Consent: It is a crime for an actor to knowingly or 
recklessly engage in an act of sexual penetration with a person who has 
not consented [internally agreed] to an act of sexual penetration. 
Schulhofer’s Penetration without Affirmative Consent: It is a crime for 
an actor to knowingly or recklessly engage in an act of sexual penetration 
with a person who has not “freely given agreement to engage in a 
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147. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 14–15 (explaining that criminal laws can promote social 
change). 
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specific act of sexual penetration, [and] communicated [that agreement] 
by conduct, words, or both.”148 
In the ordinary consent inquiry, the actus reus is satisfied when the 
complainant has not internally agreed to have sex. To be sure, the factfinder will 
ultimately look at external manifestations to determine the complainant’s mental 
state, as explained in Part I.149 However, if the jury is convinced that the 
complainant did agree, there is no further actus reus inquiry, and the defendant is 
not guilty. Schulhofer’s standard, by contrast, requires two conditions for lawful 
sex: internal agreement and external communication.150 Consequently, the 
defendant commits a crime if the complainant did not freely mentally agree or if 
the free mental agreement was not communicated. I have argued in Part I that 
Schulhofer means these two requirements to be coextensive, that is, a jury can 
use the very same evidence and analysis it would use to determine the 
complainant’s mental state to determine whether there is communication.151 This 
is made clear by Schulhofer’s comment that communication “need not take any 
particular form.”152 Given that all signs of willingness count as expressions of 
consent, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the jury has enough 
evidence to determine that the complainant internally agreed, but does not have 
sufficient evidence to find communication. Therefore, Schulhofer’s second 
prong, properly understood, is fairly superfluous.153 
The problem is that the expressive consent proposal, on its face, seems to 
require the jury to make an additional factual determination that the complainant 
engage in a certain package of external manifestations that meets some threshold 
for sufficient communication. The requirement of “communicat[ion] by conduct, 
words, or both” can easily be interpreted to limit the world of external 
manifestations that properly communicate agreement to only positive and active 
signals.154 Thus, although Schulhofer intends things like omissions, 
contextualized passivity, and foreplay to count as “communication,” this is not 
apparent from the proposed language.155 I believe that Schulhofer put in the 
phrase “words, actions, or both” as a defendant-friendly maneuver to clarify that 
sufficient communication is not limited to words, but also includes nonverbal 
signals. Nevertheless, one could very well reason that the standard would not 
insist on “words, actions, or both” if silence and passivity could sufficiently 
 
148. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). I do not make much of the fact that the affirmative consent formula uses 
the word “given.” See supra notes and accompanying text. 
149. See supra notes and accompanying text. 
150. See Affirmative Consent, supra note 2, at 5. 
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communicate agreement. Correspondingly, Schulhofer’s formulation could leave 
a jury with the impression that consent must be expressed through specific types 
of signals, although it is not totally evident which ones. If the objective is simply 
to ensure that legal actors’ and factfinders’ inquiries involve “ordinary” and 
“common sense” notions of consent based on a sincere evaluation of the entire 
situation, the requirement of communication through words or actions confuses 
and even undermines this objective.156  
A similar confusion will be present in cases that hinge on defendants’ mens 
rea. In an ordinary consent inquiry, once again, the jury will look at external 
manifestations in context, along with evidence about the defendant’s mental 
constitution, to determine whether the defendant knew or realized the substantial 
risk that the complainant did not internally agree to sex.157 Schulhofer’s 
definition of consent has the additional requirement that the internal agreement 
be communicated.158 The defendant must therefore argue both that s/he believed 
that the complainant internally agreed and that s/he believed the complainant 
sufficiently communicated that agreement through words, actions, or both. 
Parsing the difference, if any, between the belief that one’s partner is 
agreeing to sex and the belief that one’s partner is expressing agreement to sex is 
confusing, to say the least. Do defendants come to different conclusions about 
whether a complainant internally consented and whether s/he engaged in 
behavior that sufficiently expressed consent? Probably not. A person who 
sincerely believes that a sexual partner is consenting is very likely to also believe 
that the partner is expressing consent. 
Nevertheless, let us try to imagine the operation of this perplexing dual mens 
rea inquiry at trial. Take, for example, a case involving “increasingly intimate 
foreplay” between A and B that culminates in sexual penetration.159 At trial, the 
prosecution asserts that A did not want to have sex. The defense responds that, 
given A’s energetic foreplay, B believed A wanted to have sex. After an 
examination of the details of the liaison, the jury concludes that B honestly and 
even reasonably believed A wanted to have sex. However, the following 
exchange occurs at trial: 
Prosecution: You testified that you believed A wanted to have sex, but 
isn’t it true that A never said anything to the effect of, “I want to have 
sex?” 
B: That’s true. 
 
156. Id. at 4. 
157. The expressive consent proposal does not adopt a negligence mens rea. See supra note 34. 
158. See Affirmative Consent, supra, note 2, at 5 (requiring conduct show consent). 
159. Id. at 4.  
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Prosecution: So you inferred that A consented, but A actually never 
communicated the agreement. 
B: Yes. 
Now, in Schulhofer’s view, the defense has every right to argue that inferring 
agreement from foreplay is perfectly acceptable under the expressive consent 
law. But the point is that the defender, prosecutor, jury, judge, complainant, and 
defendant could very well believe that whether the defendant inferred internal 
agreement from the totality of the circumstances is a different question from 
whether the defendant believed the complainant sufficiently communicated that 
agreement through words or actions. Thus, in the example above, the jury could 
conclude both that the defendant reasonably believed that the complainant agreed 
to sex and that the defendant realized a substantial risk that “communication” of 
the consent was insufficient. I think it is unwise to have jurors engage in the 
oblique inquiry of whether the defendant believed, not that the complainant 
agreed to sex, but that the complainant engaged in a package of behavior that 
amounts, under some objective but undefined standard, to communicative 
consent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Stephen Schulhofer, along with his co-reporter Erin Murphy, has engaged in 
an impressive and important effort to reform the sorely outdated MPC provisions 
on sexual assault.160 I believe that Professor Schulhofer is earnest in his effort to 
draft criminal laws that reflect societal views of acceptable and unacceptable sex 
and protect the vulnerable from harmful sexual aggression, without punishing 
acceptable sexual practice. Moreover, I take Schulhofer’s point that there is a 
histrionic verve to the accusations that his proposal requires contracts, is fascistic 
regulation, or incorporates a presumption of guilt. Nevertheless, Schulhofer 
makes a mistake by seeking to exploit the energy of the popular affirmative 
consent reform juggernaut, without reckoning with the fact that the contours and 
values of that reform movement differ substantially from his own. 
Engaging in the affirmative consent debate is to talk of contracts, yes means 
yes, and express permission. If Schulhofer’s desire is to avoid those types of 
“artificial” requirements, he should not use the word “affirmative” in conjunction 
with his proposal. Given that Schulhofer intends to craft a sexual assault law that 
incorporates a common sense and intuitive version of sexual consent, the 
language of his proposal should just say so.161 It should simply prohibit sex 
without consent as a baseline, leaving room for increasing the penalty for 
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aggravated forms of sexual misconduct (acting in the face of active resistance, 
taking advantage of fear, using force, etc.). Abandoning the affirmative consent 
label and its communicative directives provides an additional benefit: it relieves 
Schulhofer of the need to defend criminal law as an appropriate means to shift 
sexual norms and to downplay the problems of high sentences, prosecutorial 
coercion, and mass incarceration. The history of U.S. mass incarceration counsels 
that reformers should exercise caution when using criminal law to regulate risk, 
achieve aspirational goals, and vindicate even feminist-progressive ideals. 
Professor Schulhofer is clearly a judicious superintendent of punitive authority 
and accordingly should not communicate an enthusiastic “yes” to affirmative 
consent. 
 
